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Abstract 
Corporate governance has, in recent times, raised a great deal of concern due, largely, to massive corporate failures in the 
domestic and global arena. Governments have in response to rising cases of financial distress taken both pro-active and 
reactive measures to achieve stability in the sector. However, notwithstanding government interventionist roles, stability of 
banking operations remains suspect. This study seeks to empirically determine the effect of corporate governance on the 
profitability of banking sector in Nigeria.Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) were adopted as proxies for 
banking sector profitability while capital adequacy ratio (CAR), liquidity ratio (LQR) and ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans (NPL) were adopted as proxies for corporate governance. Inflation rate was introduced as a control variable. 
Empirical evidence from the study shows significant impact of corporate governance on the profit performance of the 
Nigerian banking sector. We recommend that the regulatory authorities (CBN, NDIC and SEC) should diligently exercise 
their oversight functions to ensure strict compliance, by the banking sector,to extant regulations on corporate governance 
so as to consolidate, or possibly, improve on the gains of the initiative.  
 




As a concept, corporate governance connotes the processes involved in the discharge of the mandate of 
governance in corporate entities (Okafor, 2011). It refers to the process through which an organization is 
governed and controlled. Corporate governance codes define the relationship between company management, 
their boards and their shareholders as well as require that management and directors carry out their duties within 
a framework of accountability and transparency (Adeola, 2003). 
 
Corporate governance has become a topical issue because of its immense contributions to the growth of modern 
economies where the private sector plays a key role in the growth process. Absence of good corporate 
governance is often blamed for the woeful performance of business entities. Developed private sector-driven 
economies with history of established corporate governance structures consistently record high and predictable 
growth rates. Thus low economic growth rates that characterize developing nations areoften attributed to low 
level of corporate governance practices in these economies.  
 
There is substantial evidence of a positive link between firm performance and corporate governance. See for 
example, Ahmed and Hamdan (2015), Yusuf et al (2015), OECD (2009), Gompers et al (2003), Claessen et al 
(2002). Shleifer &Vishny (1997), Haris and Raviv (1988), Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen and Merkling 




(1976), Williams (2000), Drobetz et al (2003), Hussain et al (2000), Gemmil & Thomas (2004), etc. However, 
notwithstanding the avalanche of empirical support for positive effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance, studies like Hutchinson et al (2002) and Bathala & Rao (1995) find evidence of negative 
relationship between them while others like Park & Shin (2003) and Singh & Davidson (2003) did not establish 
any relationship. 
 
In spite of conflicting evidence for corporate governance as a major driver of corporate performance, it is 
widely acknowledged that lax or inadequate corporate governance practices promote corporate failures. The 
OECD (2009), for instance, attributes the 2007 global financial crisis to failures and weaknesses of corporate 
governance structures. Similarly, the 2009 banking crisis that led to the 2010 banking reforms in Nigeria was 
attributed to weak corporate governance structures in the affected banks (Sanusi, 2009). 
 
The increasing necessity for entrenchment of good corporate governance, in banks and other financial 
institutions, is underscored by the wave of financial scandals that led to the collapse of the world’s giant 
financial institutions early in this millennium. These corporate failures have been largely attributed to corporate 
governance failures in these institutions (see for example, Zandi, 2009; Lahart, 2009; Faber, 2009). It is also 
argued that the transition of global economies from public to private ownership of business equally makes the 
emphasis on corporate governance more compelling. Adeola (2003) explains that as an economy transits from 
state ownership of business concerns to a market-based one, the only assurance that the populace will realize the 
gains of the liberalization exercise is institution of sound corporate governance practice.This may explain why 
prominent instances of governance-related corporate failures that shook the corporate world at the turn of the 
century are traced to the US, a known example of a market-oriented economy and they include Enron (2001), 
Worldcom (2002), Arthur Anderson (2002), etc. A 2003 survey by SEC cited by the CBN (2006) shows that 
poor corporate governance was identified in most known cases of distress in financial institutions in Nigeria. 
 
Market economies are often characterized by liberalization of banking operations and promotion of competition 
thereby making banking operations more market-driven. The liberalized banking environment posessome major 
challenges particularly in the areas of manpower and regulatory capacity. For instance, a direct consequence of 
liberalizing the conditionalities for entry into banking business is a sharp increase in the number of licensed 
banks. To fill the gap created by rapid increase in the number banks in the system, unqualified and incompetent 
applicants are often recruited while the supervisory and regulatory functions of the Central Bank are longer 
effectively discharged leading to inefficiencies in corporate governance. 
 
Efficient corporate governance system in the banking sector promotes the integrity of bank management which 
defines the quality of banking services delivery and influences the overall performance of the sector. Three 
major codes of corporate governance have been issued to regulate governance-related issues in Nigerian 
banking by the SEC (2003) and CBN (2006 and 2010). These codes aim at enhancing the integrity of bank 
management and its capacity to spur growth of the economy through quality-oriented banking services delivery.  
 
To underscore the need for corporate governance as a veritable tool for improved banking sector performance in 
Nigeria, this study seeks to examine the extent to which the performance of the sector is affected by major 
indicators of corporate governance. Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) were adopted as 
proxies for profitability while capital adequacy ratio (CAR), liquidity ratio (LQR) and ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans (NPL) were adopted as proxies for corporate governance. Inflation was introduced as control 




variable. Data on these variables covering the period 2003-2015 were analyzed using the technique of the 
ordinary least squares.   
 
Conceptual issues in Corporate Governance 
Anya (2003) opines that although corporate governance has attracted a great deal of public interest in recent 
times due, largely, to its importance for the economic health of corporations and society, the concept is rather 
poorly defined globally since it covers a large number of distinct economic phenomena. Different individuals 
have explained corporate governance according to their own perception or interest. Notable among them 
include:  
 
Wolfensohn (1997) cited by Anya (2003) who asserts that corporate governance is about promoting corporate 
fairness, transparency and accountability. Dyck (2001) conceptualizes it as the ability of the outsiders 
(shareholders, non-executive directors and other stakeholders) to curtail the grabbing hands of the insiders 
(directors and managers). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) see corporate governance as a concept by which the 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments. 
 
Larkan and Tayan (2011) view corporate governance as the collection of control mechanisms that an 
organization adopts to prevent or dissuade potentially self-interest managers from engaging in activities 
detrimental to the welfare of shareholders and other stakeholders. At a minimum, the monitoring system 
consists of a board of directors to oversee management and an external auditor to express an opinion on the 
reliability of financial statements. In most cases, however, governance systems are influenced by a much 
broader group of constituents, including owners of the firm, creditors, labour unions, customers, suppliers, 
investment analysts, the media, and regulators. 
 
OECD (2004) conceives corporate governance to mean a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance outlines the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, the means of attaining those objectives as well as 
strategies for monitoring performance. 
 
Cadbury (1992) defines corporate governance as the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
He explains that the shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy 
themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the directors include 
setting the company's strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship.  
 
Okafor (2011) posits that corporate governance connotes the processes involved in the discharge of the mandate 
of governance in corporate entities. These processes enable the realization of the underlying objective of 
corporate governance which is to maximize shareholders’ value without compromising the legitimate 
expectations of other stakeholders. 
 
Coulson-Thomas (1993) quoted by Adeola (2003) conceptualizes corporate governance thus: Determining what 
needs to be done; Creating the capability to do what needs to be done; Deciding how to do what needs to be 
done; Ensuring that what needs to be done is actually done; Ensuring that what is done and how it is done 
satisfies legal and other requirements; Reporting to shareholders what has been done. 




Review of Related Literature 
Corporate governance is key to enhanced operational efficiency in banks as it promotes two growth-propelling 
factors namely, transparency and accountability in an atmosphere of clearly established reporting relationships. 
Efficiently run banks promote stability of the banking system and thereby support the growth of the economy. 
Effective corporate governance system ensures that different stakeholders are fairly treated. 
 
In a liberalized or market economy, corporate governance promotes the flow of capital (foreign and domestic) 
for enhanced economic growth and development due, largely, to its capacity to engender increased investor 
confidence and goodwill as well as promotion of transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility. Frost 
et al (2002) and Donaldson (2003) note that improvements in corporate governance practices promote market 
liquidity, investor confidence and capital formation due to improved financial disclosures.  
 
For the economy as a whole, effective corporate governance systems present a very effective solution to issues 
of financial crime thereby promoting the achievement of an investor-friendly environment, a necessary 
requirement for the inflow of foreign capital. Also, since efficiency of corporate governance structures are 
directly linked to corporate profit performance, corporate governance has immense potential to drive capital 
formation through tax revenue.   
 
Evidence in the literature shows that a good system of corporate governance in banks enhances the efficiency of 
fund allocation, promotes savings thereby reducing not only the cost of funds but also enhancing their access by 
the ultimate users. Gompers et al (2003) aver that good corporate governance practices increase firm value and 
boosts profitability. 
 
Empirical evidence of positive correlation between corporate governance and firm performance exists in 
Ahmed and Hamdan (2015), Yusuf et al (2015), Klapper & Love (2003), Black et al (2003), Drobetz (2004), 
etc. Also, Drobetz et al (2003) document evidence that good corporate governance practices lead to higher firm 
valuation. With regard to Board characteristics, Simpson & Gleason (1999) find no significant correlation 
between corporate governance and bank performance. Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe (2006) find that for listed 
firms on the Nairobi Stock Exchange, those with large boards employ more of debt financing; board 
independence correlates negatively with short-term debts; and CEO duality correlates negatively with debt 
financing. Adeusi et al (2013) find positive correlation between board size and bank performance but a 
significant negative correlation between board composition and bank performance in Nigeria.   
 
Evidence from literature shows that empirical studies on profitability-corporate governance nexus have largely 
been based on the use of board characteristics rather than firm or industry financials (like capital adequacy ratio, 
liquidity ratio, non-performing loans, etc.). This study seeks to examine the impact of corporate governance 
(proxied by capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio and ratio of non-performing loans to total loans) on banking 
sector profitability (proxied by return on equity, return on assets). 
 
Theoretical Framework   
According to the cloakroom theory of banking (Cannan, 1921), bank capital is a major determinant of bank 
performance because of its impact on the credit delivery capacity of a bank. However, Shah (1996) cited by 
Okafor (2011) argues that beyond bank capital, improvement in risk management is central to bank 
performance. This implies that a high level of bank capital alone may not automatically translate to improved 




performance. Developments in the Nigerian banking sector following the successful implementation of the 
2004/2005 bank consolidation exercise clearly supports Shah’s argument because there were clear indications 
that difficulties experienced by some banks after recapitalization derived from lapses in basic corporate 
governance principles. 
 
The theoretical construct that improvements in corporate governance structures in business organizations are 
associated with operational efficiency therefore provides the theoretical foundation for this study. The 
implication is that effective corporate governance systems in the banking sector of the economy is a pre-
requisite for enhanced operational performance and thereby value addition. This also supports the agency theory 
of business espoused by Jensen & Meckling (1976) to explain the relationship between managers (agents) and 
their principals (investors/business owners). According to the theory, separation of ownership from 
management of business organizations is saddled with an inherent problem whereby managers tend to promote 
own interests rather than those of their employers and in the process running down company. Agency problem 
can take the form of empire building whereby managers seek to entrench themselves in office (La Porta et al, 
2000), managerial expropriation which may include fraudulent cash withdrawals, asset stripping, recruitment of 
unqualified family members, cronies or associates to key managerial positions (Shleifer &Vishny, 1989). 
According to Shleifer & Vishny (1997), corporate governance seeks to resolve problems of conflict of interest, 
design ways to avert corporate misconduct and align the interests of stakeholders. 
 
Regulationof CorporateGovernance in Nigeria 
 Basically, three specific guidelines regulate corporate governance practice in the Nigerian banking sector. They 
are: 
The SEC Code of Corporate Governance (2003): Following the report of the Atedo Peterside Committee on 
Corporate Governance, the SEC issued a code of corporate governance for companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange, including 7 banks then listed.       
 
The CBN Code of Corporate Governance for Banks (2006): Inability of the 2003 code to decisively contain 
lapses in corporate governance in banks prompted the issuance of a comprehensive code to regulate governance 
practices in banks with emphases on ownership structure, organizational structure, board membership, 
performance appraisal for board, management quality and reporting relationship. 
 
The CBN Prudential Guidelines (2010): Some sections of the guidelines contain regulations aimed at 
strengthening corporate governance in banks. These provisions cover areas like tenure limitations, executive 
compensation, limitations on eligibility of former top executives of NDIC and CBN to serve in banks as well as 
limitations on tenure of external auditors and eligibility of former external auditors to be re-appointed.    
 
Methodology 
Secondary data on the selected variables or proxies were collected and analyzed to determine the extent to 
which corporate governance affects banking sector performance. Two measures of corporate performance, 
namely return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), were adoptedas proxies for banking sector 
profitability. ROE measures the amount of profit generated by a firm per naira of shareholder’s equity while 
ROA measures the ability of a firm to generate positive net income from its investments in assets.  
 




The study adopted firm liquidity as proxy for corporate governance. A major objective of corporate governance 
is to achieve a balance between maintenance of adequate level of liquidity to service customer withdrawal needs 
and the imperative of avoiding the danger of jeopardizing earning capacity due to excess liquidity. Okafor 
(2011) identified capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and liquidity ratio (LQR) as measures of long-term and short-
term liquidity respectively. Another important component of liquidity management introduced in the study is 
asset quality, proxiedby ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and advances (NPL). Higher ratios of NPL 
erode liquidity and impair capacity to meet maturing obligations. 
 
The selected proxies for corporate governance are established in literature. For instance, Supriyatna (2006) 
identified six measures of corporate governance as capital adequacy ratio, cash reserve ratio, secondary reserve 
securities, loan-to-deposit ratio, loan loss provisioning to total loans ratio and fixed assets and inventories to 
capital ratio. Konishi and Yasuda (2004) posit that maintenance capital adequacy reduces the incentive for 
excessive risk-taking by commercial banks and thereby protects stakeholders’ interests. 
 
Model Specification and Method of Analysis 
The models adopted for this study assume a linear relationship between corporate governance and banking 
sector profitability. The models were designed to determine the effect of corporate governance on two key 
profitability ratios. They are specified as follows: 
 
Model 1: ROEt = β0+ β1CARt+ β2 LQRt+ β3 NPLt+ β4 INFt+ εt 
 




ROE = Return on equity. 
ROA = Return on assets. 
CAR = Capital adequacy ratio. 
LQR = Liquidity ratio. 
NPL = Non-performing loans.  
INF = Inflation rate. 
β0 = Constant. 
β1- β4 = Coefficients to estimated. 
ε = Error term. 
 
Data on the selected variables over the period 2003-2015 subjected to econometric tests. The Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) method was used to determine the stationary trend of the data. Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) analytical technique was used to determine the effect of the selected proxies for corporate governance on 














Empirical Result and Discussions  
 
Unit Root Test: 
 
LROE (Log of ROE)  
Null Hypothesis: D(LROE) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.735485  0.0085 
Test critical values: 1% level  -6.423637  
 5% level  -3.984991  
 10% level  -3.120686  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LROA (Log of ROA) 
Null Hypothesis: D(LROA) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.369250  0.0808 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.423637  
 5% level  -2.984991  
 10% level  -2.120686  
     




LCAR = Log of CAR 
Null Hypothesis: D(LCAR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.418387  0.0072 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.200056  
 5% level  -3.175352  
 10% level  -2.728985  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
LLQR = Log of LQR 
Null Hypothesis: D(LLQR) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     




Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.857312  0.0191 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.297073  
 5% level  -3.212696  
 10% level  -2.747676  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
 
LNPL = Log of NPL 
Null Hypothesis: D(LNPL) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.351503  0.0379 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.200056  
 5% level  -3.175352  
 10% level  -2.728985  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
LINF = Log of INF 
Null Hypothesis: D(LINF) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.604572  0.1234 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.297073  
 5% level  -3.212696  
 10% level  -2.747676  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
The result for all the variables shows evidence of stationarity at 5 per cent level of significance, hence a 




Dependent Variable: LROE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/07/16   Time: 21:41   
Sample: 2003 2015   
Included observations: 11   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.931482 10.55668 0.372416 0.7224 
LCAR 0.916492 0.467602 -1.959982 0.0977 
LLQR 0.483849 2.384851 0.202884 0.0125 




LNPL 0.147340 0.394541 0.373446 0.7217 
LINF -0.144644 0.857828 -0.168617 0.8716 
     
     R-squared 0.614213     Mean dependent var 3.191396 
Adjusted R-squared 0.603689     S.D. dependent var 0.816476 
S.E. of regression 0.806747     Akaike info criterion 2.711343 
Sum squared resid 3.905048     Schwarz criterion 2.892204 
Log likelihood -9.912385     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.597335 
F-statistic 15.56066     Durbin-Watson stat 1.608526 
Prob(F-statistic) 1.450794    
     
      
The result for model 2 shows significant negative impact of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and liquidity ratio 
(LQR), at 10 per cent and 5 per cent significant levels respectively, on return on assets (ROA). These results do 
not conform to a priori expectations and are indications of lax corporate governance. They indicate 
maintenance of sub-optimal (inadequate or excess) levels of liquidity which impairs profit performance. The 
result also shows significant positive effect of non-performing loans (NPL) on ROA. This result conforms to a 
priori expectation and implies that the level of NPL supports enhanced profitability. Inflation was shown to 
have a non-significant effect on ROA. 
 
The R-squared value (49.65 per cent) and Adjusted R-squared (47.58 per cent) show that corporate governance 
proxied by CAR, LQR and NPL as well as INF explain the profit performance of the banking sector to a 
significant extent. The Durbin-Watson statistic (1.64) shows no auto-correlation. 
 
Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendation 
Evidence emanating from the study shows some level of concurrence in the response of different measures of 
profitability to selected proxies for corporate governance. For instance, the result shows significant negative 
impact of capital adequacy ratio (CAR) on both measures of profitability (ROE and ROA). There is also 
evidence of improvement in asset quality as suggested by the positive effect of corporate governance (proxied 
by NPL) on banking sector profitability. However, while the impact of NPL on ROE is not significant, it was 
shown to impact ROA significantly. The study also shows significant positive effect of liquidity ratio on return 
on equity but for return on assets there is evidence of significant negative impact. Finally, inflation was 
observed to have a non-significant impact on banking sector profitability. 
 
Following from the above results, the study concludes that, over the period of this review, there is evidence that 
corporate governance has significantly affected the performance of the Nigerian banking sector. 
 
We recommend that the regulatory authorities (CBN, NDIC, SEC) should diligently exercise their oversight 
functions to ensure strict compliance with extant regulations on corporate governance so as to consolidate, or 
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